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ABSTRACT
The paper discusses Zvi Griliches' contribution to the estimation of the earning function. The topic
was the central theme of Griliches' research agenda during the 70s. Griliches played a major role in
the ability- schooling controversy of the time. He was instrumental in repelling the attack of the
"revisionists" on the Theory of Human Capital, and the claim that the schooling effect in the earning
function is merely an artifact of the true "ability" and "family background" effects. Griliches lacked
at the time the proper data to prove unequivocally that the ability bias plays only a minor role in the
estimation of the rate of return to schooling. He was, however, able to show that the seemingly
foolproof evidence of his opponents suffers from serious biases due to the endogeneity and the
measurement errors in the schooling variable. His assertion that the standard OLS estimator is biased











Zvi Griliches’ Contribution to the Theory of Human Capital 
 
A.   Introduction 
The acquisition and dissemination of knowledge were the central theme of Zvi 
Griliches’ research agenda.  Early in his career he stood beside Ted Schultz when 
Schultz ushered in the human capital revolution. He helped Schultz (1960) in his 
first forage in search of a solution to the “residual” puzzle (together with Gary 
Becker and Albert Rees), and, in turn, served on Gary Becker’s NBER reading 
committee that approved the 1964 Human Capital manuscript. Thirty years later, at 
the 1993 memorial conference to his close friend Yoram Ben Porath, Griliches 
summarized in “Education, Human Capital and Growth −  a Personal Perspective” 
(1997) his own venture into the field. 
  The reviewer of Zvi Griliches’ contribution to the theory of Human Capital 
faces, therefore, a dual challenge. On the one hand, almost every paper Griliches 
has ever written bears on what he called “Knowledge Capital”. To summarize his 
contribution implies, therefore, summarizing his career. On the other hand, 
Griliches on several occasions (Griliches, 1977 and 1997, Krueger and Taylor, 
2000) provided a detailed and accurate summary himself. The escape route chosen 
by this reviewer is to narrow down the definition of the theory −  focusing on 
Griliches’ contribution to the estimation of the earning function, replacing the 
personal perspective with the perspective of a (hopefully) objective onlooker, with 
the hindsight of forty years.   4
Griliches’ prime interest lay in the social returns to learning. He was mainly 
interested in the role of education in the aggregate production function and its 
contribution to the explanation of the residual in growth accounting. He entered the 
field of earning functions only in order to improve his measure of “labor quality”. 
The wage function to him was the analogue of a hedonic price function from which 
he can derive the proper weights to be used in computing the “quality index” used 
in the estimation of the aggregate production function (1970). Griliches joined the 
heated “schooling-ability” controversy of the 70s almost inadvertently. He was 
trying to get a better estimate of the relative contribution of schooling and ability to 
growth, feeling uncomfortable with the conventional Denison split of two to one, 
and its  implication that the gross earning differential due to schooling overstates 
the “true” schooling effect by almost one half (Denison ,1964). 
But if his entry into this skirmish was unintentional, his students drew him into it 
even further. William Mason’s Ph.D. dissertation led to their joint study of 
“Education, Income and Ability” (1972), which in turn led to the first confrontation 
with the Pennsylvania “revisionists.” Gary Chamberlain’s dissertation (1975) led to 
the second round, the debate focusing on the conclusions that can be drawn from 
the economic success of brothers (Chamberlain and Griliches 1975). The debate 
gave birth to his Presidential address at the 1975 Third World Congress of the 
Econometric Society, and to the follow-up “Sibling Survey” (1979). 
When the dust settled, Griliches’ interest in the problems of the estimation of the 
earning function waned. He returned to his pastimes in the fields of productivity, 
R&D, patents and hedonic prices. He revisited the earning function only once more   5
in the mid 80s (together with John Bound and Bronwyn Hall, 1986) in a partly 
successful attempt to test whether families and schools treat brothers and sisters 
symmetrically.
1 
At the end of the day, Griliches always believed in measurement. If one looks for 
a measure of the relative importance of the research on earnings function in 
Griliches’ research agenda, a crude measure would be the number of papers he 
wrote on the topic, relative to his total academic output. Browsing through his July 
1998 CV, I found 11 out of 129 papers, which dealt directly with the estimation of 
the earning function. This is by no means a large fraction of the outpour of papers 
and ideas that characterized his career. Being one of the first experts on 
unobservables, and a pioneer of hedonic price functions Griliches would have 
certainly complained that the crude counting measure does not give proper weight 
to the aspect of quality. As, perhaps, the world’s leading expert on economic gossip, 
Griliches would have consulted the index of citations, to find that only three of his 
22 “golden hits” (papers cited more than one hundred times) are devoted to the 
discussion of earning functions (the 1971 ability paper with Mason, the 
Econometric Society Presidential Address (1977), and the Sibling Model survey 
(1979)). Neither can rival the popularity of his greatest hits, the 1957  Econometrica 
Hybrid corn paper, the 1967 Econometrica Distributed Lags survey, his 1967 paper 
with Dale Jorgensen on the measurement on sources of measured productivity 
change, and the 1984 Econometrica paper on Econometric Models for Count Data. 
Given these crude measures, one may wonder whether the term “contribution” is 
justified in the context of the theory of human capital? Griliches himself never 
                                                             
1   Also in this case was the study instigated by a student Ph.D dissertation (Shackett, 1981).   6
claimed that he contributed to the development of the theory of human capital 
(definitely not if one uses the narrow definition of theory adopted in this paper). 
Still I am going to claim the Griliches played a crucial role in the development of 
the theory, just by being the right person, at the right time, at the right place. 
To support this claim, I will provide a brief description of the state of the Theory 
of Human Capital in the 60s and early 70s. I will proceed describing Griliches’ 
contribution. The fourth section will describe the aftermath of the big controversy 
of the 70s, and the paper will close with some concluding comments. 
This paper, by no means, attempts to serve as a survey of the literature on earning 
functions.
2 It suffers from an intentional selection bias, focusing on Griliches’ 
contribution, all other contributions serving as backdrop scenery. 
 
B. Earning  Functions  −  Childhood and Early Adolescence. 
The earning function is clearly not a new subject to economics. Its birth preceded that 
of the Theory of Human Capital. Clark (1937) analyzed the lifetime earnings of 
selected occupations in the 30s, Friedman and Kuznets (1954) analyzed the earnings of 
independent professions, and Blank and Stigler (1957) did it for scientific personnel. 
Houthakker (1959) analyzed the earning differentials associated with schooling based 
on the 1950 census of population. 
  In 1960 Miller published his paper, “Annual and Lifetime Income in Relation to 
Education: 1938− 1959.” The analysis was based on the 1940 and 1950 U.S. Census of 
                                                             
2   Several surveys have been written on the topic over the years. It is worth noting that this is the only topic that 
the editors of the Handbook of Labour Economics chose to survey twice. The first edition (1986) contained an 
extensive survey by Robert Willis, and the 1999 third volume contained a survey of recent developments by 
David Carol.   7
Population and on 1947, 1957 and 1959 Current Population Surveys. The paper was, 
perhaps, the last comprehensive study of earning in the U.S. that was not couched in 
the Theory of Human Capital jargon, and it is worth, therefore, reciting some of its 
results. 
3 
 In the introduction to the paper Miller sounds almost apologetic: “Although the 
material gains of an education have been selected for study, the intent has not been to 
slur the more subtle satisfactions that come with greater educational attainment. The 
cultural and social advantages associated with more schooling may well be worth 
their cost in time, money, and effort, even if the economic advantages cease to exist.” 
(p. 962). When presenting his results on the schooling-earning differentials, he is 
cautious to warn that “there is a always the possibility, indeed the probability, that the 
higher incomes of those with more years of schooling are due in part to differences in 
intelligence, home environment, family connection and other factors which result from 
individual differences in ability and opportunity. Therefore, to some extent, the 
observed relationship between schooling and earnings may be a spurious one. It is, of 
course, difficult if at all possible to measure the extent to which these extraneous 
factors enter this relationship.” (p.964). 
  Miller’s empirical findings, such as the “sheepskin” effect and the constant 
earnings differentials between high school and college graduates, have become the 
stylized facts of future research. His explanations do not sound outdated even today. 
According to these explanations the “sheepskin” effect reflects “selection in terms of 
ability”; and the constant earning differential since the pre-war era, in spite of the fast 
                                                             
3   Miller was familiar with T.W. Schultz’s writings and with early versions of Becker’s theory (Becker, 
1960).   8
increase in the supply of college graduates, can be attributed to an increase in demand 
for college-labor driven by technological change.
4 
The fact that Miller’s research has never come close to the popularity of Becker’s and 
Mincer’s work can be traced to the novel theoretical framework presented by Becker, 
and the imaginative interaction between theory and empirical tools which characterizes 
Mincer’s studies. 
Becker was naturally aware of the criticism that his estimates of the rate of return to 
college education are biased because of differences in ability between college and 
high-school graduates. He was the first to admit that a large fraction of the high school 
vs. elementary school earning differential should be attributed to differences in ability. 
Becker, however, went through an extensive analysis, citing several sources of data, to 
show that the ability bias in the estimate of the rate of return to college education is 
minor (1964, pp. 79− 88). Among other pieces of evidence , he shows that if rank in 
class is used as a measure of ability the bias is of the order of magnitude of 12 
percent.
5 
Most skeptics seemed to be  convinced by the Becker analysis. The only opposing 
view was that of Denison (1962, 1964). Following Schultz, Denison tried to separate 
the unexplained “growth residual” into its components. Examining the same data 
surveyed by Becker, he concluded that about one third of the schooling effect should 
be attributed to ability. In spite of this dissenting view, most Labor Economics 
                                                             
4   Some of the insights in Miller’s paper, for example, the changing composition of the “ability pool” of 
different schooling groups over time, are popular topics of research even today. 
5   Another piece of evidence is based on the comparisons of high school graduates with college 
dropouts, since the two groups seem to have similar class ranks in high school, and similar scores on 
IQ tests. Comparing the rates of return to college dropouts and college graduates the bias is estimated   9
practitioners accepted Becker’s conclusion that “it may be concluded that, even after 
adjustment for differential ability, the private rate of return to a typical white male 
college graduate would be considerable” (1964, p. 88). 
  The following decade can be considered as the heydays of the Theory of 
Human Capital, and the earning function estimates. Ben Porath (1967) employed an 
elegant optimum control model to explain the concavity of the age-earning profile. 
Mincer (1962, 1974) demonstrated how the on-the-job training model could serve as a 
powerful tool in analyzing the earning distribution. Becker (1967) presented a more 
comprehensive model where the demand for schooling and the supply of funds 
determine simultaneously the level of schooling and earnings. In this model “ability” 
explains the interpersonal variation in demand, and “opportunities” explain the 
variation in supply. The covariation of these factors determines the distribution of 
earnings.  Parsons (1972) borrowed the concept of “specific human capital,” to explain 
mobility patterns and the unemployment structure. Each of these studies gave rise to 
additional studies, building on the foundations of their predecessors, leading an even 
“jaundiced” critic such as Mark Blaug to admit “that the human-capital research 
program has displayed a simply amazing fecundity, spawning new research projects in 
almost every branch of economics.” (1976, p. 833). 
The “ability bias” issue remained dormant for the rest of the 60s. The major reason for 
this loss of interest was, perhaps, the dearth of data. The only two new samples that 
included direct measures of ability were clearly non-representative, and could not shed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to be about one-third. In an early paper on the social rate of return to college education (1960) Becker 
concludes that ability differentials account for 2 out of the 11 percentage points return.   10
any new light on the phenomenon.
6 It was Griliches who reawakened the issue when 
he tried to “appeal” Denison’s conclusions.
7 His 1970 survey signaled a new wave of 
studies focusing on the ability-schooling interaction. This wave was rekindled by the 
availability of new sources of data containing direct observations on IQ test scores, 
schooling, and earning. Some of these studies were written by Griliches himself (with 
collaborators), but many came from other directions. 
The first of these studies were John Hause’s. In his 1972 paper he examined four 
bodies of data, finding strong evidence of complementarity between ability, schooling 
and post-school experience. Ability differentials have no effect on earnings at the 
lower schooling levels, but have a significant effect at higher schooling levels, this 
effect becoming more pronounced the larger the worker’s labor force experience. 
Consequently, the ability bias in the estimate of the rate of return of college education 
is insignificant, when the earnings are observed at the early stages of one’s career, and 
are of moderate importance (3− 18 percent) when one examines the earnings of prime 
age workers. 
One of the bodies of data surveyed in the Hause 1972 paper was the NBER-Thorndike 
sample. The sample consisted of World War II U.S. Air force volunteers who were re-
interviewed in 1955 by Robert Thorndike and Elizabeth Hagen. The 1943 data 
containing the scores on a battery of 17 tests was complemented in 1955 by additional 
tests and data on earnings. Paul Taubman and Terence Wales who discovered the data 
                                                             
6   Ashenfelter and Mooney (1968) used a sample derived from the upper tail of the ability distribution 
(Woodrow Wilson Fellowship holders) only to find that the ability bias is miniscule. Hansen, 
Weisbrod and Scanlon (1970) derived their sample from the opposite tail of the distribution (sampling 
military rejects) and found that introducing AFQT scores into the (linear) wage equation reduces the 
schooling coefficient significantly.  
7   See next section.   11
enlisted the help of the National Bureau of Economic Research to re-interview about 
6,000 of these men in 1969
8. The sample’s selection criterion resulted in an over-
representation of high ability −  highly educated men, but it was at the time, both in 
terms of quality and in terms of size, by far superior to any other similar body of data
9. 
Taubman and Wales analyzed their sample and reach somewhat different conclusions 
from those reached by Hause. Like Hause, they found that ability has little effect on 
starting salaries but that its effect grows over time; growing, perhaps, even more 
rapidly for those with graduate training and high ability. However their estimate for 
the ability-bias was significantly higher than that of Hause
10. They found a bias of 15-
25 percent. When one controls also for age, the ability bias increases to 30-35 percent. 
Though this estimate was arrived controlling for age rather than work-experience, this 
is the estimate Taubman chose as the “true” ability-bias.
11  Not less disturbing to the 
standard theory was the conclusion that “it is almost certain that, for those in this 
cohort who are at least high-school graduates, ability is a more important determinant 
of the range of the income distribution than is education” (1974, p.9). 
To an innocent bystander like Clark Kerr
12,“potentially even more damaging to 
human-capital theory (was) the Taubman-Wales finding that, for those with some 
                                                             
8 Paul Taubman and his collaborators were pioneers in the field of primary data collection, preceding 
by more than a decade the wave of the data collection of the 90’s.  
9   The Taubman-Wales sample consisted of 4,440 observations. John Hause used a sub-sample of 2,300 
observations. 
10 The Taubman-Wales analysis differs from the Hause study in several respects: 1) it uses a larger 
sample, including self-employed; 2) the “ability” variable is defined differently; and 3) it uses a 
different mathematical specification of the earnings function.  
11    See Taubman’s comments on the Griliches-Mason paper (1972), and Juster’s summary of the 
Taubman-Wales findings (1974). 
 
12    Clark Kerr, the ex-chancellor of the University of California, was the Chairman of the Carnegie 
Commission on Higher Education that co-sponsored the Taubman-Wales study. The citation is taken 
from his introduction to the book (1974).   12
college or a B.A., a substantial part of the earnings advantage associated with 
education was attributable to “screening,” that is, the requirements or preferences of 
employers for those with a college education”. It is doubtful whether the supporting 
evidence for this far-reaching  conclusion- the over-representation of college graduates 
in the better paying occupations- would, today, be regarded as a  threat to the Theory 
of Human Capital. What seemed threatening at the time was the avalanche of elegant 
theoretical paper relating to schooling as a signaling device. 
This fad started with Spence’s Ph.D. dissertation (1973, 1974) followed by Arrow 
(1973), Stiglitz (1975), and Riley (1975, 1979). The common feature of these models 
is the argument that schools do not “produce” any “market-oriented skills”, but just aid 
employers who try to screen their workers according to “ability.” The more “able” 
workers are also more efficient at producing “schooling,” and hence will “purchase” 
more “schooling” to signal their higher ability. The perplexing feature of this theory is 
that its empirical implications are almost indistinguishable from the “traditional” 
theory of Human Capital. Taubman and Wales, however, claimed that their results 
could serve as support of the “Screening Theory,” and a refutation of the traditional 
theory. 
  To better understand the importance and timeliness of Zvi Griliches’ 
Presidential Address, it is worth reproducing some of the points of criticism raised by 
Mark Blaug in his “slightly jaundiced” survey of “The Empirical Status of Human 
Capital Theory” written on the eve of the Econometric Society meeting. Blaug 
reserved special scorn to the estimation of the standard Mincer-type earning function. 
“ No wonder the bulk of empirical work inspired by the human-capital 
framework has taken the form of regressing the earnings of individuals on such   13
variables, as native ability, family background, place of residence, years of 
schooling, years of work experience, occupational status, and the like −  the so-
called “earnings function.” It is sometimes difficult in all this research to see 
precisely what hypothesis is being tested, other than that schooling and work 
experience are important and that native ability and family background are 
not”.  (1976, p.832). 
 
In his summary Blaug has to admit 
“We must give credit where credit is due. The human-capital research 
program has moved steadily away from some of its early naive formulations, 
and has boldly attacked certain traditionally neglected topics in economics, 
such as the distribution of personal income. Moreover, it has never entirely 
lost sight of its original goal of demonstrating that a wide range of apparently 
disconnected phenomena in the world are the outcome of a definite pattern of 
individual decisions, having in common the features of forgoing present gains 
for the prospect of future ones. In so doing, it discovered novel facts, such as 
the correlation between education and age-specific earnings, which have 
opened up entirely new areas of research in economics. Whether this 
momentum can be maintained in the future is, of course, anybody’s guess, but 
it is noteworthy that the screening hypothesis first emerged in the writings of 
adherents to the human-capital research program, and to this day the most 
fruitful empirical work in the testing of credentialist hypotheses continues to 
emerge from the friends rather than the enemies of human-capital theory.” 
 
But this did nothing to dampen his criticism 
 
“We are thus condemned to judge the human-capital research program 
largely in its own terms, which is strictly speaking impossible −  even the flat-
earth research program, judged in its own terms, is not faring too badly! 
There are certainly grounds for thinking that the human-capital research 
program is now in something of a “crisis…. Its rate-of-return calculations 
repeatedly turn up significant, unexplained differences in the yields of 
investment in different types of human capital, but its schooling-model 
explanation of the distribution of earnings nevertheless goes on blithely 
assuming that all rates of return to human-capital formation are equalized at 
the margin. Worse still, is the persistent resort to ad hoc auxiliary assumptions 
to account for every perverse result, culminating in a certain tendency to 
mindlessly grind out the same calculation with a new set of data which are 
typical signs of degeneration in a scientific research program.” 
 
The Presidential Address did not try to cope with all the points of criticism raised by 
Blaug. It focused on what Griliches regarded as the greatest empirical challenge −  the   14
most recent estimates of the ability bias, in the hope that disproving the “revisionists” 
on this critical issue will dispel at least some of the felling of “crisis.” 
  By the time Griliches delivered his Presidential Address, the “revisionists” were 
already preparing their next “assault,” introducing into the “battlefield,” what they 
must have considered the “ultimate weapon” −  the twin data. Twin data were not alien 
to social scientists. Jensen and his co-authors were using this type of data almost a 
decade before (1967) to isolate the role of heredity, environment and luck. Taubman 
and his coauthors stumbled on the NAS-NRC sample of twins almost accidentally. But 
once their students awakened them to the existence of the data, they realized 
immediately their importance to the ongoing debate. 
  Taubman published his first paper on the topic in 1976, and the summary of his 
study in 1980. A new term was introduced into the econometric and the labor 
economists’ jargon-kinometrics, and in 1977 the first conference was held on the 
findings and  the econometrics of sibling data. 
  The implicit assumptions driving the twin model were simple. In its simplest 
version (Willis, 1986) the twin model assumes that the unobservable variables can be 
divided into two parts: “heredity” (or, “genetic”) variables and “environmental” 
variables. Identical twins (MZ) share the same hereditary and environmental variables. 
Hence, running the earning regression “within” MZ cells (where the dependent 
variable is the difference in earnings and the explanatory variable the difference in 
schooling) one can isolate these effects, and generate the “true” schooling effect. 
Moreover, since non-identical twins (DZ) share only the same environmental 
variables, the same “within” regression run in the DZ sample will generate a schooling   15
coefficient that reflects both the “true” schooling effect and the hereditary effect. A 
comparison with the MZ results yields, therefore, the net hereditary effect. Finally, the 
comparison of the standard regression for unrelated workers with the DZ regression 
allows the isolation of the environment effects.
13 
  A sub-sample of the twin sample used by Taubman et al, contained direct 
information on the respondents’ cognitive skills. Controlling for this variable in a 
standard earning-schooling regression for mature workers reduced the schooling 
coefficient by 35 percent. Rerunning the regression for the whole sample on the 
individual data (not controlling for cognitive skills), the crude schooling coefficient 
was found to be 0.08. Controlling for observed family background variables, the 
coefficient declined to 0.07. The “within” DZ regression, controlling for unobserved 
common environment, yielded a coefficient of 0.06, and the “within” MZ regression 
yielded an estimate of the “true” schooling coefficient of 0.025. According to these 
findings, the “true” ability bias was, therefore, about two- thirds of the standard 
estimate! 
  Taubman and his co-authors (Behrman et al., 1980) were quick to draw their 
policy recommendations. They concluded “ that policies to equalize schooling will 
have little effect on inequality of earning or status. Family plays a major role in 
generating inequality of education, occupational status and earnings. It appears, 
however, that most of the family effects arise out of genetic endowment; thus, policies 
designed to equalize opportunity defined solely in terms of family environment will 
leave substantial inequality of outcomes within a generation.” (p.32). The only 
                                                             
 
13   More complex models and their implicit econometric assumptions are discussed in Goldberger 
(1977).   16
message of hope the authors had for their readers was in terms of intergenerational 
mobility: Eliminating all environmental differences should eliminate almost the whole 
intergenerational correlation in earning. For most readers that would be a small solace! 
 
C. Griliches Steps In. 
Griliches opened his academic career with a series of blockbusters −  his studies 
of hybrid corn (1957, 1958). As he tells his story (Krueger and Taylor, 2000) he 
knew relatively little about agriculture, but he learned from his personal experience 
the importance of learning. The problems associated with diffusion of new 
knowledge were hand-tailored for his talents. From there, it was only a small step to 
a series of studies in which he tried to isolate the contribution of education and 
investment in R&D to measured productivity in agriculture (1963a, 1963b, 1964). 
The major finding of these studies was that the “labor quality” measure (i.e., the 
education of farm labor) enters the aggregate agriculture production function with a 
coefficient which is not significantly different from that of the labor variable. 
Hence, one can combine both the quantity and quality dimensions of labor into one 
variable. He also found that though the elasticity of output with respect of R&E 
expenditures (research and extension services) is rather low (about 5 percent), the 
social rate of return to these expenditures is extremely high (about 300 percent). 
The next natural step was a territorial expansion into manufacturing (1967a, 
1968), and his work with Dale Jorgensen (1966, 1967b). In 1968 when the National 
Board of Economic Research convened its annual conference on Income and 
Wealth, focusing on the topic of “Education, Income and Human Capital,” Griliches   17
was the natural candidate to present the survey on the “Role of Education in 
Production Functions and Growth Accounting” (1970). 
After discussing the different ways “quality” can be introduced as a parameter 
in the production function, the paper discusses to the problems of aggregation. The 
search for a common denominator of the different kinds of labor (distinguished by 
occupation, schooling, race, gender, location, etc.) lead Griliches to conclude: “the 
next small step is obviously not in the direction of a very large number of types of 
labor, but rather towards the question of whether there are a few underlying 
relevant “dimensions of labor,” which could explain, satisfactorily, the observed 
diversity in the wages paid to different “kinds” of labor. The obvious analogy here 
is to hedonic or characteristics approach to the analysis of quality change in 
consumer goods… One can identify the “human capital” approach as a one-
dimensional version of such an approach” (1970, p. 90). 
In his basic equation 
(1) u H r w w i i + + = 0  
the wage of (wi ) consists of the remuneration for “raw labor” (w0 ) and the “rental 
value of units of human capital (r H). The problem, of course, with this analysis is 
that whereas car fins and engine power are measurable, human capital units  (Hi) are 
unobserved.
14 
  The next section is named “ability”. Surprisingly, this section, which is 
somewhat tangential to the issues of growth accounting, turns out to be the central 
                                                             
14    Griliches was, of course, aware of this distinction. He even suggested that “if one is willing to 
assume that the implicit prices (w0 and r) are constant, and one has repeated observations for a given 
(observation), one can use such a framework to estimate the unobserved “latent” (Hi) variable” 
(ibid.)   18
part of the survey, occupying almost one-third of its length. What must have 
triggered the analysis was Denison’s 1964 suggestion that about one-third of the 
observed income-by-schooling differential should not be attributed to learning but 
to natural talent. Griliches resented this assertion not just in the context of the 
secular contribution to growth, but primarily because of its implication for the 
estimates of  the rate of return to schooling derived from cross-section surveys.
  Griliches’ starting point is the standard model 
(2)  , u A S y i 2 i 1 0 i + β + β + β =  
where  y  denotes income, S – schooling, A – ability, and  2 1 and β β  are assumed to 
be positive. The crude schooling regression coefficient (bys) is upward biased as 
long as the correlation between schooling  S  and the omitted variable A is positive. 
(3)  . 0 b b b E AS 1 AS 2 1 ys > ⇔ β > β + β =  
But is this so? Griliches had his doubts about the direction and size of the bias, and 
its interpretation. As he phrased it: “Much of measured ability is the product of 
“learning” even if it is not the product of “schooling.” Often what passes as 
“ability” is actually some measure of “achievement,” and the argument could be 
made that it, in turn, is determined by a relation of the form 
(4) A  =  , 4 3 2 1 0 v G LH QS S + + + + + α α α α α  
where S is the level of schooling, QS is the quality of schooling, LH are the learning 
inputs at “home,” and G is the original genetic endowment.” Here in a nutshell are 
the four factors the search for whom will preoccupy Griliches throughout the 
coming decade.   19
 The total effect of “reproducible” human capital (including the quality of schooling 
and learning at home) equals 
(5)   , ) b b ( S . LH 3 S . QS 2 1 2 1 α + α + α β + β  
where the b-terms in the parentheses are the regression coefficient of school quality 
(QS) and home-learning (LH) on years of schooling (S). Comparing equation (2) 
with equation (4), it is not clear whether the simple regression coefficient  bys does 
in fact overstate the total effect. 
  Griliches had also his doubts about the relative magnitude of the auxiliary 
regression coefficient  bAS .  Ability may interact with schooling and have a 
significant effect on earnings at high level of schooling, but  bAS itself may be quite 
low. Furthermore, the interaction between schooling and ability (or measured 
intelligence) is not a one-way relationship. It can be affected by schooling and the 
person’s environment, and, in turn, it affects the amount of learning achieved in a 
given schooling situation. The more intelligent student is endowed with a greater 
initial endowment of knowledge and is more efficient in acquiring additional 
knowledge. “One might venture to define the gross output of the schooling system 
as ability,” and at least part of the apparent returns to ability should be imputed to 
the schooling system. This part should be quite large assuming, as Griliches did, 
that ability is not the binding constraint in the determination of schooling levels. 
  Griliches returned to the data examined by Denison and could not find evidence 
to justify the large correction recommended by him. A large fraction of Denison’s 
ability correction is ascribed to father’s occupation and regional income   20
differentials,
15 and “ less than one-third of the “one-third” adjustment is related 
conceptually to ability per se.” (ibid., p. 103). Griliches stuck to this estimate of a 
“10 percent adjustment” throughout his career! 
 To support his own argument concerning the small magnitude of the ability bias he 
cites a Swedish study (Husen 1968).The study included, in addition to the data on 
the earnings at the age of 35 by schooling, the IQ tests at the age of 10 of the men 
interviewed. It showed that, though the IQ explained almost 25 percent of the 
variance of log earnings, the bias introduced by its omission is minimal (4 percent).
  For the next round, the 1971 University of Chicago workshop on “Investment 
in Education: The Equity-Efficiency Quandary,”
16 Griliches came already equipped 
with the data he was looking for. The data were based on a 1964 sample of U.S. 
military veterans.
17 The 1964 CPS data on earnings and schooling were collated 
with their military records containing information on their pre-military schooling 
levels, and their scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Tests (AFQT), and 
socio-economic background. The sample consisted of about 1500 fully employed 
men in the age group 21 to 34. 
About one-third of the men in the sample continued their schooling after the 
military career. The variable ‘years studied after the military’ played a major role in 
the analysis because it allowed the authors to break the alleged simultaneous 
relationship between ‘ability’ and ‘schooling’.  Since ‘ability’ (i.e., AFQT scores) 
                                                             
15   Denison’s conclusions are based on tables where the proxy for ability is father’s occupation. 
Griliches argues that father’s occupation is positively correlated with more learning at home and with 
a higher quality of schooling. At least the second factor should be subtracted from the schooling effect. 
16   An early version of the paper was presented in a conference on Structural Equation Models in 
Madison (Wisconsin) in November 1970.   21
was measured prior to the military career, and schooling related to post-military 
schooling, the direction of the causality is unambivalent. Griliches and Mason noted 
that introducing the AFQT scores into the log-linear equation reduced this 
schooling coefficient by 10 percent. The introduction of post-military schooling, 
together with father’s occupation and pre-military region of residence, reduced the 
coefficient by 12 percent. 
Using as a measure of schooling the variable ‘total schooling’ (rather than 
‘post-military schooling’), the ability bias increases considerably.
18 To explain the 
sensitivity of the results to the measure of schooling, the authors enlisted an error of 
measurement model, where “education” is measured with an error  
(6)  , 0 ) , ( cov ,
" ' " ' = + = i i i i i S S and S S S  
where S’ is measured schooling and S” is the measurement error. The authors called 
this error  ‘schooling quality’ and assumed  cov (S”, A) > 0, i.e., the more able 
enjoy higher school quality. The partial regression coefficient of earnings on 
measured schooling, controlling for ability, equals 
 (7)  )] 1 ( / ) ( 1 [
2
' ' " 1 '
.. AS AS A S A S Y r b b B − − =β  
Thus, if the assumption that  0 b A " S >  holds, the partial regression coefficient will 
understate the “true” schooling coefficient  1 β . The risk of this bias is reduced if 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 The data were provided by his collaborator, William Mason, who used them in his (sociology) Ph.D. 
dissertation.  
1828 percent where both ‘ability’ and family background are omitted from the equation, and 15 percent 
when only ‘ability’ is omitted.      22
one uses as the schooling variable −  ‘incremental schooling’ (post-military 
schooling) instead of ‘pre-military’ or ‘total schooling’.
19 
  The authors expanded the model to incorporate errors of measurement in 
ability, embedding them in a framework of a recursive model. In this model 
measured “background factors” and unobservable heredity feed into ability and 
‘initial schooling’, ‘initial schooling’ and ‘initial ability’ determine the changes in 
ability, which, in turn, determines earning. The more complex model and estimation 
procedure (two-stage-least-square) did not, however, lead to any additional insights 
into the schooling-ability relation. 
  The discussant of the Griliches – Mason paper at the Chicago workshop was 
Paul Taubman. This was the beginning of a decade that can only be characterized 
by the words of the song “Everything You Can Do −  I Can Do Better!” 
  Taubman thought his work with Wales had not been given sufficient credit, and 
he regarded (rightly) his NBER-Thorndike data to be superior to those used by 
Griliches and Mason. However, the only explanation he could provide for the 
difference in the findings was the linearization of the schooling variable (i.e., the 
use of a continuous schooling variable instead of dummy variables) and the use of 
the total AFQT scores rather than the individual tests
20. 
  The next round was again set by one of Griliches’ students. This time it was 
Gary Chamberlain, and his Ph.D. dissertation, “Unobservables in Econometric 
                                                             
19   The authors ignore the possibility that the pre-military AFQT score affects the draftee’s millitary 
career and his decision to continue his schooling. Thus even if  A " S b  is smaller for incremental 
schooling, 
2
A ' S r  can be larger. 
20 The Griliches – Mason AFQT variable did not contain the breakdown for the different tests.   23
Models” (1975). One way to isolate the unobservable variables requires the use 
“multi-dimensional” data. The standard procedure would be the use of panel data, 
where the time dimension allows for the isolation of the unobservable “individual” 
effects. Panel data in the early 70s were still rare, and covered only a short-time 
span. Perhaps more important, panel data do not contain, in general, sufficient 
temporal variation in schooling −  the variable the research focused on. 
  Chamberlain and Griliches (1975) reverted, therefore, to siblings’ data as a 
source that will allow them, hopefully, to control for family environment. The idea 
of choosing brothers to get a better measure of the effect of schooling was not 
novel
21, what was novel was the set of econometric tools brought to the analysis. 
  Two fundamental changes were introduced in the model. Whereas, in the 1970 
paper ‘ability’ was defined as the endogenous variable −  being the “gross output of 
the schooling system,” in the 1975 schooling is affected by ability. Equation (3) is 
replaced by an equation of the type 
 (8)  ; 1 0 w A S + + = γ γ  
making S an endogenous variable. The “repeated” observations (i.e., the 
observation for the two brothers) are the basis of the variance-components model 
 (9)  , a f A ij i ij + =  
where  i  denotes the family,  j the sibling, fi  is the family component and of  aij the 
individual component. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
21   The Gorseline data used by Chamberlain and Griliches had already been discussed by Becker 
(1964).   24
  Unfortunately, the data used by Chamberlain-Griliches (1975) could not bear 
the weight of the econometric method. To demonstrate the usefulness of their new 
tool, the authors reverted to a small sample of brothers (127 pairs) already analyzed by 
Gorseline (1932). The limitations of the data forced Chamberlain and Griliches to be 
very careful in the phrasing of their conclusion “that at least in 1927, in Indiana, 
differences in parental background were not an important source of bias in the 
estimated returns to schooling” (1975, p. 429). An even more elaborate estimation 
method led to a similar conclusion – i.e., that the unobserved variable affected income, 
but had only a negligible effect on schooling.
22 The authors are forced, therefore, to 
sum up this empirical attempt with a retraction: “So our prior expectation that the 
unobservable which we call “ability” would be an important determinant of schooling 
and interpretable as IQ or family wealth is not born out by the data.” (ibid.,p.431). 
Additional toying with the model led only to new question marks,
23 generating a 
typical Griliches summary: “From a substantive point of view, the new econometric 
methods did not produce results which differed greatly from those based on simpler 
methods. This is either satisfying or disappointing, depending on one’s point of view. 
An elaborate procedure, designed to detect possible sources of bias, yielded little 
evidence of such bias. It is quite likely that important unobserved variables have been 
left out from our schooling-achievement model, but they are not of the type one usually 
associates with notion of intellectual “ability.” 
                                                             
22This was true both for the magnitudes of the coefficients and to the fit of the equations.    
23   The initial variance-component model relied heavily on the assumption that economic success (y in 
equation 1) has two independent manifestations: income and occupational status (i.e., the random 
components (u) in the two structural equations for y are uncorrelated). The lack of correlation was the   25
The contribution of the Chamberlain-Griliches 1975 paper is, therefore, confined 
mostly to the econometric technique, and little insights were gained concerning the 
ability-schooling interaction. The same can be said about its twin −  the Chamberlain-
Griliches 1977 paper at the conference of Kinometrics.
24  While Chamberlain and 
Griliches were toying with their poor quality sample of brothers, Taubman came up 
with his sample of twins (1976, and Behrman et al. 1980). 
Griliches chose the state for the next confrontation with the “revisionists.” It was 
the Third World Congress of the Econometric Society, which convened in Toronto in 
August 1975. Zvi Griliches delivered the Presidential Address. He was the first 
economist engaged in the “new” Labor Economics research to be elected as President 
of the Society,
25 and the stature of the presidency clearly added weight to the message. 
The recursive model presented in the paper was a combination of the Griliches-
Mason and the Chamberlain-Griliches models. Given the limitations of the data (the 
NLSY sample
26), the conclusion that the “overall direct contribution of “ability,” as 
measured by test scores, to the explanation of the variance of individual expected 
earnings is quite small, on the order of .01,” has to be treated with care. 
More important was the digression to the topic of errors of measurement in 
schooling and their impact on the estimated rate of return. Griliches had already 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




f /σ σ . The data clearly rejected the independence 




g /σ σ  with simulations.  
24   In the 1997 paper Chamberlain and Grilishes used a sample, employed by Griliches before (1976) of 
282 brothers derived from the 1966-69 rounds of the NLSY (the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Young Men). In contrast to the Gorseline data this survey had direct observations on the IQ scores (it 
even had the scores of tests conducted at two different points of time), but it lacked data on the most 
important variable −  earnings, because most brothers were still too young to participate in the labor 
force. The authors had, therefore, to replace this crucial information with imputations. 
25   The only other President of the Society who contributed to Labor Economics is Marc Neslove. 
26  See  footnote  23.   26
touched upon this topic before, in his paper with Mason,
27 but here, for the first time, 
he demonstrated that under reasonable assumption concerning the magnitude of the 
ability effect and the schooling-ability correlation, the downward bias due to 
measurement errors, when one controls for ability, can be as large as the upward bias, 
when ability is omitted from the equation 
(10)  ' AS 2
2





" S /σ σ = λ  is the error component in schooling, and the  i β  are the schooling 
and ability effects (see equation 1). Additional variables in the earning function can 
exacerbate this problem. 
The final section of the paper discussed the endogeneity of the schooling variable. 
The problem itself was not new to readers of Griliches’ earlier papers (see equation 7), 
or to practitioners in the field.
28 The Presidential Address helped in moving the 
problem to the center-stage.
29 Griliches mentions two sources of this endogeneity:         
a. The positive correlation between the ex-post random component in earnings and the 
ex-ante random component in anticipated earnings that affect the schooling decision.  
b. The effect unobserved ability has on both schooling and earnings. Citing Rosen, 
Griliches showed that one could not rule out the possibility that ability has a negative 
effect on schooling, and that the simple OLS schooling coefficient suffers, therefore, 
from a serious downward bias
30. 
                                                             
27   In the Griliches-Mason (1972) paper the authors preferred to call the error “school quality”. 
28   Griliches himself attributes the discussion to his readings in Becker and Mincer and his discussions 
with Sherwin Rosen. 
29  Endogeneity is the central theme of both surveys on the earning function in the Handbook of Labor 
Economics (1986, 1999), attesting to its importance. 
30   If the more able are endowed with a higher initial stock of human capital they may spend fewer 
years in school. This may also be true if the more able are faster learners.   27
The Presidential Address did not cope directly with the challenge posed by the 
Taubman twin studies. In the 1977 conference on Kinometrics it was Goldberger who 
carried the skeptics’ flag. It took Griliches another two years to prepare his response 
(1979). The Sibling Models “Partial Survey” is a scathing attack on the “within” 
family regression as a device to neutralize family effects. Griliches goes through a 
series of examples where a “within” family regression may inflate biases instead of 
eliminating them. The most serious of these cases is again the case of errors of 
measurement in the schooling variable. The lengthy list of possible biases and 
identification problems can be regarded as aimed at Taubman and his co-authors, but it 
contains more than a grain of self-criticism: “In short, one cannot really hope to 
estimate very complicated models, which allow for a variety of unmeasured influences. 
Either one has better data in which the errors-in-variables problem does not arise, or 
one has to limit oneself to a very short and specific list of left-out variables and ways 
in which they affect the model. Latent-variable models and estimation techniques are 
no substitute for good data and substantive restrictions” (1979, p. S48). 
His criticism of the “twin models” echoes that of Goldberger:  
“On observed variables, MZs (identical twins) are more similar than DZs 
(fraternal twins). On the latent variable, genotype, it is known that MZs are 
more similar than DZs. On the latent variable, environment, it is not known 
whether MZs are more similar than DZs. Assume that they are not. Then 
attribute the excess observed resemblance of MZs to their excess genetic 
resemblance, thus estimating the role of heredity. 
That is the gist of the twin method. Since the equal-environmental-correlation 
assumption is questionable, the estimates produced by the method should be 
viewed skeptically” (Goldberger ,1997, p. 299). 
 
The final section of the survey emphasizes the importance of family decisions as a 
determinant of siblings’ schooling and intra-family inequality in earning. Griliches   28
expressed his belief that families act as income equalizers, but admits that much more 
has to be learned in order to understand the effect of family background on their 
children’s economic success.
31 
The survey’s “Provisional Summary” reads as Griliches’ summary of his ten-year 
excursion into the field of earnings functions. It is worth citing it verbatim: 
“The following appears to be a fair summary of the state of our knowledge on this 
topic: Measured parental characteristics (except for race and region) appear to affect 
earnings primarily via their effect on the level of achieved schooling. The market does 
not appear to pay for them directly. Unmeasured “family” characteristics have a 
substantial though not large effect on the variance of earnings (10− 15 percent), but 
their interpretation is obscure. In particular, they cannot be interpreted as reflecting 
“visible” parental status effects such as wealth, which were already proxied to some 
extent by the measured demographic variables. They consist of all the influences on 
which brothers are “closer” to each other than a randomly drawn pair from the same 
population. But such influences include race, region, spatial proximity, similarity in 
the school system and peer groups of origin, similarity in the cultural environment, 
which includes influences which extend far beyond the original “family” boundaries, 
and similarity in subsequent environments. They should not be interpreted, except 
tautologically, as reflecting the force of family influences. They reflect the force of 
accidents of birth into a family, race, region, city, ethnic group, and more, and the fact 
that spatial and social mobility within half a generation is not perfect. Even with much 
mobility, people on average move only some distance from their original location in 
                                                             
31   Michael made a similar comment at the Kinometrics conference (1977).   29
geographic and social space. The correlation between brothers’ earnings reflects this 
and should not be interpreted as being solely the effect of “family,” or “class,” nor as 
implying that there is no escape from ones “background.” Note that all the 
background (and “foreground”) measures taken together do not explain much more 
than about 30 percent of the observed variance of log earnings. If one were to make a 
major adjustment for the effect of transitory earnings, one would still be left with the 
conclusion that the inequality (opportunity?) within families is about as large as that 
between families. Whether the glass is half full or half empty depends on the point of 
view of the observer…. 
I have not tried to break down the family effect into “genetics” versus 
“environment,” since even if were possible, it is not clear that it would give us any 
more handles on the problem without a fuller understanding of the mechanism by 
which these forces exert their influence. Some genetic differences might be corrigible 
(e.g., by enzymes), while for some environmental influences, such as cultural 
background, there are not effective intervention methods known. 
Whether unmeasured common-to-brothers effects bias significantly the schooling 
coefficient is not clear. The direct evidence if ambiguous. If some weight is given to the 
possibility of errors of measurement and endogeneity of schooling, then much of the 
asserted bias disappears. 
What good then are sibling data if by solving one problem (omitted familial 
variables) they aggravate other problems? While no panacea, they do provide us with 
a richer set of observational data and allow us to complicate our models and ask for 
more detailed answers. In econometric terms, they give us a larger set of instrumental   30
variables, but only at the cost of explicit restrictions on the structure of our models. 
Something more is learned, but as is often the case in science, much of what is learned 
extends the dimensions of the unknown (Griliches 1979, pp. S59-S60). 
 
D. Earning Functions −  Maturity 
The early 80s witnessed the subsidence of the ability-schooling controversy. In his 
survey for the Handbook of Labor Economics (1986), Willis when discussing the 
ability-bias, adopts the stand  Griliches took in his  summary of the 1979 survey: 
“The literature surveyed can be characterized as ranging between two extreme 
positions, one saying that family effects are various and many and that they 
lead to serious overestimation solely from differences between siblings, 
preferably MZ twins. The other extreme would take the position that family 
effects work almost entirely via schooling and hence cause little bias in the 
estimate of its coefficient, and that the decline observed in within-sibling 
estimates is the result of the aggravation of other problems, such as errors in 
measurement and simultaneity and not the reflection of true family effects. The 
evidence at this point is ambiguous. Some sibling studies show little change in 
the schooling coefficient, some show much. The latter can be explained by 
reasonable rates of measurement error, but this the leaves the former 
unexplained. Unfortunately, data are not currently available which would allow 
the estimation of a metamodel nesting both of these positions within it.” 
(Griliches 1979, pp. S81). 
 
  Willis himself expanded the simple ability-schooling model, when in his paper 
with Rosen (1979) he allowed for two different types of abilities. The model allowed 
for specialization according to comparative advantage, the person self-selecting into 
college and high school depending on his type of ability and rate of interest he faces. 
The Willis-Rosen model allows the estimation of both “ability-free” rates of return to 
schooling, and the sensitivity of college enrollment to wage differentials. In many   31
respects it comes close to the model Griliches was outlining in his 1977 Presidential 
Address. 
          Subsequent research (Lillard, 1977) confirmed Hause’s findings that the 
Griliches data were flawed because ability differences hardly show up at the early 
stages of one’s work career and their effect on earnings becomes more pronounced 
only as the person grows older. This finding could not have caught Griliches by 
surprise, because, as we have seen, he was aware of the weakness of his data. On the 
other hand, the passage of time has shown him to be right on the effect of many of the 
latent variables that preoccupied him during the stormy 70s.  
The analysis of twin data remained dormant for more than a decade. The inactivity 
was not due to exhaustion but due to the lack of new data. Then in 1994, fifteen years 
after the Sibling Survey, the “fight’ was resumed. By now Griliches was out of the 
game, and his position was taken up by two newcomers to the field - Ashenfelter and 
Krueger (1994).  Following Taubman and his collaborators, Ashenfelter and Krueger 
did not wait for the data to come to their doorstep, but went looking for it as the 1991 
Twinsburg Twins Festival. Their results (1994) seemed to vindicate Griliches’ 
assertions. Correcting for the measurement error in schooling, they find that previous 
estimates of the rate of return to schooling were downward biased. Their estimate (12-
16 percent) was twice as large as previous estimates and higher than the original 
estimates obtained when ability and measurement errors were not controlled for. 
Following Griliches they could not find a significant effect of ability on schooling, but 
that measurement errors in schooling introduce a significant downward bias in the rate   32
of return estimate.
32 The authors used the schooling of the twin reported by his 
brothers as an instrumental variable to correct for errors of measurement, and found 
that the corrected coefficient exceeds the standard “within” regression coefficient by 
over 80 percent!  
      Almost at the same time Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman (1994) published 
their most recent findings based on their new samples. The NAS-NRC Twins sample, 
used in their original study, was supplemented by the Minnesota Twin Registry. Their 
analysis was not confined to the effect of “natural endowments” on schooling and 
earnings, but was expanded to the marriage market, to explore the impact of 
endowments and schooling on assortive mating. The authors reiterate their previous 
conclusion that the rate of return to schooling is about 4 percent. Allowing for 
measurement errors in the schooling variable ( instrumenting the own reported 
schooling variable by the variable reported by the person’s child) increases the 
estimate to  5 percent. The 30 percent bias was well bellow the Ashenfelter- Krueger 
estimate. 
          Subsequent rounds of the Twinsburg Twins sample have shown that 
Ashenfelter- Krueger first round results suffered from a sampling error. The June 1999 
issue of the Economics of Education Review 
33 served as the stage of the last round of 
the twin controversy. Rouse (1999) summarized the results of the first four rounds of 
the Twinsburg sample. She finds a rate of return to schooling of 10 percent, but she 
also finds, using within twins regressions, that the standard cross-section OLS 
estimates suffer from a small upward bias (about 6 percent).  
                                                             
32   The error component constituted about 10 percent of the measured variance of schooling −  the 
estimate used by Griliches.   33
        Griliches’ students extended his old stand: Neumark (1999) argued that the 
within-twin IV estimator amplifies the bias from any omitted ability difference 
between twins, relative to the standard within-twins estimator. Bound and Solon 
(1999) argued that one cannot relate to the schooling differential of the identical twins 
as exogenous. The differential in schooling in this case is clearly not random, and the 
within-twin estimation is vulnerable, therefore, therefore,  to the same endogeneity 
bias as the cross-section estimates. 
         Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999) use a resurvey of the Minnesota twins to show 
that the upward bias in the OLS cross-section estimate is statistically significant. The 
authors are also careful to point out that the source of this bias need not be the direct 
effect of ‘natural endowments’ on schooling, but may originate from the correlation of 
this variable with other family characteristics that affect schooling, and, hence, may 
vary from one sample to the next. The reader cannot but notice that the authors’ most 
recent estimate of the bias –12 percent- is almost exactly the size of the bias assumed 
by Griliches and by Becker, when they started this journey. 
  One of the first to follow Griliches’ advice to incorporate a direct measure of 
school quality in the earnings function was Behrman. In his study with Birdsall (1983) 
of earnings in Brazil he uses the schooling level of the teachers as a measure of school 
quality. The authors argue that since quantity and quality of schooling are positively 
correlated (as assumed by Griliches and Mason), the omission of the quality variable 
leads to an upward bias in the estimate of the returns to years of schooling, and can 
explain in many cases the observed differential in the rate of return among individuals, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
33 A journal that did not even exist at the time of the first round of this controversy.    34
and between different regions. From a policy point of view the investment in school 
quality may yield higher returns than those from investing in quantity. 
The 90s witnessed a reawakening of interest in this issue. In their survey Card and 
Krueger (1996) tend to confirm  Griliches’ assertion −  school resources have a positive 
effect on future income, but  they are careful to warn that  the evidence is not always 
conclusive. Griliches assumed that the quality effect is additive (see equation 4). In the 
Card and Krueger model
34 the effect is more complex: it increases the slope of the 
schooling-earning gradient (since each year of schooling “produces” more human 
capital, the higher the school’s quality), but it may also affect the intercept (because of 
self-selection −  students attending better schools decide to invest more in schooling). 
Reduced form regressions show that a 10 percent increase in school resources increase 
the future income of students by 0.4-1.1 percent. 
  The Presidential Address in 1975 played an important role in highlighting the 
importance of the simultaneity problem in the estimation of the rate of return to 
schooling. Griliches traced the simultaneity to ability and expected earnings affecting 
actual earnings, while affecting also schooling demand. Subsequent research returned 
to the structural equations framework outlined in Becker’s Woytinsky Lecture (1967). 
Several studies tried to identify this structure of demand and supply of schooling by 
using institutional features of the education system (for example, distance to college) 
as identifiers of the demand side, and as instruments in the estimation of the ability-
schooling interaction. On the 23
rd anniversary of Griliches’ Presidential Address, 
                                                             
34 The Card- Krueger model is very similar to that used by Behrman and Birdsall (1983).    35
David Card delivered the Fisher-Schultz Lecture at the 1998 Meeting of the European 
Econometric Society. In his lecture, he summarized these attempts (2001): 
“A supply and demand framework leads to a somewhat richer econometric model 
for schooling and earnings than is usually adopted in the applied literature.  In 
particular, the implied data generation process for earnings has both a random 
intercept (reflecting differences across individuals in the amount they could earn at 
every level of schooling) and a random education slope (reflecting differences across 
individuals in the marginal return to education). Although one can still estimate a 
standard human capital earnings function by standard OLS or IV methods, the 
parameter estimates must be interpreted carefully. Even IV estimation based on ideal 
instruments (observable factors that are by assumption independent of individual 
abilities) will typically recover a weighted average of returns to education for people 
whose education choices were affected by the instrument, rather than the average 
marginal return to education in the population. 
The recent literature that uses supply-side features to instrument schooling 
choices tends to find IV estimates of the return to schooling that at least as big and 
sometimes substantially bigger than the corresponding OLS estimates. In many cases 
the IV estimates are relatively imprecise, and none of the empirical strategies is based 
on true randomization. Thus, no individual study is likely to be decisive in the debate 
over the magnitude of ability biases in OLS estimates of the return to schooling. Taken 
as a whole, however, the findings from the recent IV literature are remarkably 
consistent with Griliches’ (1977) assessment of a much earlier set of studies, and point 
to a causal effect of education that is as big or bigger than the OLS estimated return,   36
at least for whose schooling choices are affected by the supply-side innovations that 
have been studies so far.” (2001, p. 1158). 
Griliches was aware of the limitations of the panel data he was using, and in his 
Presidential Address he expressed his hope that “Advantage should be taken of the 
time series nature of the various survey panels that have become available. All of the 
studies mentioned, including my own, have yet to approach such data from a truly 
dynamic point of view” (1977, p.17). Wolpin and the “structural empiricists” took up 
this challenge. The “structuralists” combined the Willis-Rosen comparative advantage 
model (1979) with a Mortensen-style search model to create a complex model 
describing the sequential schooling- market work decision. According to this 
approach, the parameters of the wage function are affected not merely by the skill 




E. Summary – Zvi Griliches’ Contribution to the Theory of Human Capital 
At the turn of the millennium Jacob Mincer’s earning function is alive and well. 
Attesting to its robust health is the extensive discussion of the increasing earning 
differentials in the U.S. and U.K. in the 90s that was conducted fully in the vernacular 
of the Human Capital Theory
36. The ability-schooling controversy is by now part of 
the history of economic thought. 
                                                             
35   For a recent summary of this literature see Wolpin (2003). 
36   For a summary of this literature see the survey by Katz and Autor in The Handbook of Labor 
Economics (1999). 
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At the end of the day one may ask: what was Zvi Griliches’ contribution to the 
flourishing of this field? At the outset we had to admit that Griliches did not contribute 
to the development of the theory. His forte’ was in measurement. He and his 
collaborators brought to the field a set of new econometric tools, which allowed more 
precise answers to the problem. As a result we have gained a better understanding of 
the role of unobservables in the schooling-earning interaction. Ironically, Griliches 
may have entered the field prematurely. There was a jarring gap between the crudeness 
of his data and the sophistication of his econometric tool-kit. The data that could show 
his virtuosity were, unfortunately, in the hands of his “opponents.” 
As a result Griliches’ role was confined to repelling the opponents’ attack. In this 
position he had no rival. The forefathers of the earning-function did not seem to share 
the feeling of “crisis”. Becker was basically a theorist, and his discussion of empirical 
results in the Theory of Human Capital (1964) was an exception, rather than the rule. 
Mincer was preoccupied with his own research agenda, and was never disturbed by 
critics. At the time none of the younger labor economists had the reputation of 
Griliches. So it fell to him (with the aid of Goldberger) to face the “onslaught”. 
  His penetrating analysis of his opponents’ data and methodology pointed out 
the loopholes in their seemingly foolproof arguments. Though he lacked the 
appropriate data, most of his assertions have proven to be correct. 
Blaug concludes his 1976 survey paper: 
“Nothing is easier than predicting the future course of scientific 
development −  and nothing is more likely to be wrong. Nevertheless, let me 
rush in where angels fear to tread. In all likelihood, the human-capital 
research program will never die, but it will gradually fade away to be 
swallowed up by the new theory of signaling, the theory of how employees, 
and indeed all buyers and sellers select each other when their attributes   38
matter but when information about these attributes is subject to uncertainty. 
In time, the screening hypothesis will be seen to have marked a turning 
point in the “human investment revolution in economic thought,” a turning 
point to a richer, still more comprehensive view of the sequential lifecycle 
choices of individuals.” (1976, p. 850). 
 
  Griliches’ timely intervention was crucial in turning the tide. Once again it was 
shown that economic forecasting should be left to the angels! 
 
  As I come to the end of this survey I would like to introduce a personal note. 
The reader  of this survey may be left with a lingering puzzle: What led Zvi, who was, 
after-all, interested in the measurement of the social contribution of “knowledge” to 
economic growth, to devote a decade of his research to a problem  whose main 
implications relate to the private returns of education?   I don’t think that Zvi took up 
the fight to defend the purity of econometric identification methods, or to impress his 
readers with a new elegant recursive model. He took up the fight because he was an 
ardent believer that (as he put it) “our findings concerning the earnings functions (of 
siblings and others) should not be interpreted as being solely the effect of “family” vs 
“class,” nor as implying that there is no escape from one’s “background”.” Zvi, the 
immigrant who arrived on the shores of Palestine at the age of 17 with no 
“background,” and who later arrived in the U.S. with only the human capital he 
accumulated in a crash program in Israel to his name, truly believed schooling was the 
main channel for social and economic mobility.     39
  In his interview with Krueger and Taylor (2000) Zvi was asked about the 
concluding section of his Presidential Address citing The House of Pooh Corner.
37 But 
if I had to remember Zvi for this paper, I would not have cited A.A. Milne but rather 
Zvi’s own words:” It is a sad fact that in doing empirical work we must continuously 
search for the passage between the Scylla of biased inferences due to left out and 
confounded influences, and the Charybdis of overzealously purging our data of most 
of their identifying variance, being left largely with noise and error in our hands.” I 
believe that this is the way Zvi wanted us to remember him, as a Ulysses, in his 
sailor’s cap, who took the helm of the boat at a critical moment to navigate it to quieter 
waters. He stopped at the Island of Human Capital for ten years, only to continue his 
long voyage home. 
                                                             
37   “How would it be,” said Pooh slowly, “if, as soon as we’re out of sight of this Pit, we try to find it 
again?” 
“What’s the good of that? Said Rabbit. 
  “Well, said Pooh, “we keep looking for Home, and not finding it, so I thought that if we 
looked for this Pit, we’d be sure not to find it, which would be a Good Thing, because then we might 
find something that we weren’t looking for, which might be just what we were looking for, really.” 
  “I don’t see much sense in that,” said Rabbit. 
  “No,” said Pooh humbly, “there isn’t. But there was going to be when I began it. It’s just that 
something happened to it on the way.”  A.A. Milne, The House at Pooh Corner 
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